Introduction
Over the past two decades, as the discipline has moved into the legal mainstream, investment lawyers have engaged with many core aspects of public international law. Rules on remedies, defences such as necessity, the canons of treaty interpretation, Vienna Convention rules on denunciation -all these now regularly feature in investment jurisprudence and form the subject of engaged commentary.
Their increasing relevance reflects the gradual integration of investment law into the international legal discourse. 1 Among the core aspects of international law, the legal rules governing State succession occupy a special place. State succession -typically understood to mean "the definitive replacement of one State by another in respect of sovereignty over a given territory" 2 -is one of the lesser-liked branches of public international law. It is widely perceived to be technical, complex and controversial: an area of law characterised by "an almost total doctrinal schism" 3 (notably between supporters of a continuity approach, and those arguing that new State should be able to start with a 'clean slate' 4 ), but also by the nitty-gritty detail of bilateral diplomatic practice.
Many international lawyers, including those with generalist leanings, tend to steer In fairness, until recently, State succession to investment treaties may not have seemed a topic worthy of detailed analysis. The contemporary incarnation of the investment protection regime, based on bilateral investment treaties and regular access to international arbitration, is of fairly recent origin after all; it was established simply too late to be affected by the main waves of state succession that swept the international system before the 1970s. To be sure, the most important of them -the decolonisation process that resulted in the creation of dozens of States after 1945 -prompted heated debates about the status of alien property post independence. 6 However, at the time, these debates typically implicated contractual arrangements and rules of general international law (notably on expropriation) rather than investment treaties and treaty-based arbitration. 7 In fact, even the next wave of succession, viz. the break-up of States in Central and Eastern
Europe during the 1990s, for a while was not considered to raise real issues of investment treaty law. what is intended is not an in-depth discussion of particular problems (such as, for example, the status of Macao under Chinese BITs). Instead, the subsequent considerations are in the form of a conspectus of the legal rules applicable to different types of succession scenarios, offered to inform debate about a particularly tricky area of public international law now confronting investment lawyers.
Succession to Treaties: Basic Features
When Going beyond country studies, Tai-Heng Cheng provides a fuller analysis, but his approach is based on a rather broad notion of 'State succession', which, contrary to most legal authorities, he understands to encompass "state and government succession": see his State Succession and Commercial Obligations (2006) , at 4; and cf. below, section 2.b., for comment. 16 As Crawford notes, "the phrase 'state succession' is employed to describe an area, a source of problems: it does not connote any overriding principle, or even a presumption, that a transmission or succession of legal rights and duties occurs in a given case"; in this sense, the "municipal analogy of continuity of legal personality in an individual's general property, passing as an inheritance, involving a partial or 'universal succession'" is indeed "misleading": see Crawford (n 2 
a) A Fragmented and Disputed Area of Law
The legal regime governing questions of succession is fragmented and, as a general 306 (not yet in force). 24 Nearly forty years after its adoption, the Convention has no more than 22 parties: see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=en. 25 In its written submissions in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros case before the International Court of Justice, Hungary argued that the 1978 Vienna Convention was "widely regarded as an unsuccessful exercise in international law-making … which does not correspond to subsequent practice": see Reply of Hungary, 20 June 1995 (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/10965.pdf), at 173. For further discussion of one of the Convention's most controversial propositions see below, section 4a.
characterised, more than in other areas of international law, by a practice of "diplomatic bricolage, the collecting of bits and pieces from normative materials … lying around in treaties, doctrinal writings and diplomatic discourse".
b) Distinguishing State Succession from Other Phenomena
Before assessing the work of the 'diplomatic bricoleurs' in the field of investment law, it is useful to delimit the scope of application of the regime of State succession.
While the preceding section has emphasised the breadth of the notion of 'State replacement' (which is at the heart of the State succession regime), it is important to note that that regime does not apply to other ruptures affecting treaty relations.
Three such other ruptures merit at least some brief comment.
Changes not affecting a State's legal personality: First, State succession needs to be distinguished from changes that do not affect the legal personality of the State. 28 In essence, where a State, notwithstanding changes to its structure or territory, remains identical, the question of succession to treaties does not arise: as the legal personality of the State remains the same, so do its treaty rights and obligations. 
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The orthodox approach has however not been followed through rigorously; "political pragmatism" has (to adapt the subtitle of a detailed study) to some extent mollified the strictures of "legal theories" or "traditional axioms". 54 This e.g. applies to the Soviet Union and Ethiopia (in relation to Eritrea). Insofar as colonial powers, pursuant to Article 70, applied the ICSID Convention to overseas territories for whose representation they bore responsibility (e.g. the Netherlands in respect of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles), no attempt has been made to 'upgrade' the status of these territories to full membership. 55 63 According to UNCTAD's recent country study, the figure is significantly higher: see Investment Policy
Review: Sudan (http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2014d5_en.pdf, at 54), which lists 21 BITs. 64 It is worth noting in passing that, irrespective of debates about the level of customary protection, in investment law, it is protection by treaty that matters, as only the treaty will typically confer upon claimants a right to raise treaty violations before arbitral tribunals, and as that right will be restricted to treaty breaches. As a consequence, one of the common arguments in succession debates -that customary international law would offer continuous protection -provides no easy way out. or to become a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession of States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates." According to Article 24, bilateral treaties are "considered as being in force between a newly independent State and the other State party when: (a) they expressly so agree; or (b) by reason of their conduct they are to be considered as having so agreed". For comment see Hafner/Novak (n 17), 409-410; and Zimmermann/Devaney (n 17), at 518 (arguing that, during the decolonization process, "the universal succession to obligations of previous colonial powers was seen as completely irreconcilable ….
[this] ultimately resulted in the inclusion of the special regime for newly independent States in the VCSST").
automaticity principle has been widely criticised as overly broad (failing to reflect the diverse practice of States) and as unjust (based, as it is, on a categorical distinction between newly-independent and other successor States 72 In its Report, the ILA made the point very clearly, when noting that negotiations are the most common means of addressing succcession issues (n 17, at 27): "la pratique de la négociation prévaut concernant la succession en matière de traités". 73 According to the ILA, negotiations proceed from a 'presumption of treaty continuity': see ILA Report (n 17, at 27): "la présomption de la continuité est la prémisse fondamentale en matière de succession d'Etats -afin de sauvegarder la stabilité des relations internationales".
A case-by-case handling of succession issues, which has been aptly described as a turn from 'substance' (or substantive legal principle) to 'procedure' (or process), 74 can no doubt clarify the status of particular treaties. However, it has left the general regime in a state of flux: outside party agreement on the continuity (or discontinuity) of a given treaty, there is a rather large grey zone of uncertainty. At the same time, the more recent debate reflects a desire for greater differentiation and flexibility: while terms such as 'strict continuity' and 'clean slate' remain popular, practice has sought to explore "more nuanced solutions". 75 For present purposes, two such "nuanced solutions" -both of which point to a more flexible handling of succession issues -are of particular relevance.
A first approach proceeds from a distinction between different categories of treaties. of the preceding considerations, it need not always arise. In fact, the trends towards process and flexibility highlighted above mean that quite often, it can be avoided. To illustrate this point, and seeking to present a balanced account of potential issues arising in investment treaty disputes, the subsequent sections provide an (admittedly selective) overview of recent treaty practice regarding succession to BITs (aa), and highlight factors that, in the absence of express agreement, could indicate that the parties implicitly agreed to the continued application of a prior BIT (bb).
Following these considerations, section (cc) briefly revisits the debate about automatic succession to BITs.
aa) Explicit Party Agreements
The first point is based on a rather trite proposition: before rehearsing arguments about automatic succession to treaties, it is useful to analyse whether "the fate of [a agreed on the matter.
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The list is illustrative rather than exhaustive: clearly, in seeking to establish the intention of the parties, tribunals or other decision-makers are not bound to a strict canon of admissible sources. It also bears re-iterating that, whatever evidence has been brought forward, will need to be evaluated in the light of all factual circumstances. However, with these caveats, the preceding considerations suggest that, such intention can be deduced from other statements, or inferred from conduct. In this respect, the absence of an explicit party agreement on (dis-)continuity does not conclude matters; it means that the matter needs to be studied more fully.
cc) Automatic Succession to BITs?
In the light of the preceding considerations, the question of automatic succession may perhaps not arise frequently; in many disputes, the treaty parties, explicitly or implicitly, have expressed a view. Nevertheless, it remains relevant, both conceptually and in relation to cases in which the parties' intention cannot be for automatic succession is weak. 133 The fact that, when determining the fate of BITs through explicit agreements, new States and their treaty partners have almost inevitably opted for treaty stability, does not necessarily affect this understanding.
As in other areas of international law, the impact of explicit treaty agreements on the underlying customary norm is ambivalent: while explicit agreements reflect the appeal of continuity (and thus the ratio of Article 34), the fondness of States for negotiated outcomes can equally be said to undermine the case for automatic succession. 134 On the basis of these arguments, recent studies reject the view that new States were automatically bound by prior BITs; unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the new State position starts with a clean 'BIT slate'.
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There is force to such an approach, but perhaps it does not do full justice to arguments in favour of automatic succession to BITs. If that case were made, 136 it would need to be based on analysis that looks beyond the number of parties, and that takes issue with the characterisation of BITs as "essentially voluntary" interState arrangements. 137 An argument for automaticity could instead emphasise that, 133 See ILC Yearbook 1974, vol. II/1, at 239; and cf. supra, section 4.a.
134 See Dumberry (n 5), 82: "the very fact that such negotiation took place in most cases suggests that third States have generally not accepted the principle of automatic succession." 135 See Genest (n 15), 9 (arguing that "clean slate and mutual consent should prevail for all seceding states in respect of bilateral treaties"); Dumberry (n 15), 27 ("the tabula rasa principle should apply to all new states"); Dumberry (n 5), 81 ("there is no automatic continuity of bilateral treaties because of the particular nature of these treaties. Any treaty continuation is ultimately the result of the express (or tacit) agreement of both States" [footnotes omitted]). 136 So far, to the author's knowledge, the case for automaticity has not so far been set out in detail.
For a clear exposition of its likely starting point -in the context of a separate State succession question -see the the affidavit of Sir Daniel Bethlehem submitted in the Sanum proceedings before the Singapore High Court: At para. 42, Sir Daniel notes: "While it is a treaty between the PRC and Laos, binding on the two States as parties, [the China-Laos BIT] also establishes a legal framework that is expressly intended for the benefit of private persons who qualify as 'investors', both natural persons and economic entities (PRC/Laos BIT, Article 1(2)). More specifically, Articles 2-6 of the BIT create rights for qualified investors that are actionable in their own name under the dispute settlement provisions of Article 8 of the BIT. So, although the BIT is an instrument concluded by the PRC and Laos, and binding upon them, it also creates actionable rights for natural and legal persons having the nationality, or which are established under the laws, of the Contracting States. other's commitments. … In other cases, the individual citizens do the relying -they make investments in the territory of the other state because of the assurance (often contained in a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation or bilateral investment treaty) that they have a right to establish themselves and that their investment will not be taken from them except upon prompt, adequate and effective compensation." It is worth noting that, in order for such an argument to open the way towards treaty-based arbitration, one would need to argue that rights acquired under an applicable BIT are opposable to the successor State as a matter of treaty law. 
Cession, Incorporation and Their Impact on Investment Treaties
Questions of treaty succession are not restricted to the emergence of new States.
The broad definition set out in (2012), 500. In the Sanum case, the arbitral tribunal noted that there was "unanimity or 'quasi-unanimity' among the doctrine to consider that Article 15 … represents customary international law" (n 9, at para. 221). 145 See references in fn. 8 and 9.
proceedings, the rules applicable to this type of State succession are in fact rather settled.
a) The General Regime: Moving Treaty Frontiers
The general regime has been developed by reference to instances of cession. It is premised on the understanding that, while a part of territory is transferred, the legal personality of the transferring and receiving States remains intact. 146 In this scenario, the widely accepted default rule leaves the treaty status of the two States untouched and merely extends the geographical scope of treaties by moving their 'frontiers'. The result is relatively straightforward: as noted by Zimmermann, "treaties of the predecessor cease to be in force in respect of the ceded territory while treaties of the successor generally extend ipso facto to this territory." 147 The two paragraphs of Article 15 of the 1978 Convention provide for this substitution; in so doing, they ensure that, for each State, treaties are "binding in respect of its entire territory".
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As with other rules (and as the use of the term 'generally' in Zimmermann's formulation suggests), the moving treaty frontiers rule does not apply absolutely.
The law leaves room for agreement to the contrary; and where a treaty specifically relates to the ceded territory, a contrary approach may indeed be called for. Article 15 of the 1978 Vienna Convention gives effect to these considerations by admitting for exceptions to the moving frontier principle if its application "would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the 146 As the ILC noted in its commentary, instances of cession "do involve a 'succession of States' in the sense that this concept is used in the present draft articles, namely a replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory" (ILC Yearbook 1974, vol. II/1, 208). 147 Zimmermann, EPIL (n 17), para 8. Waldock's more complicated formulation distinguishes between a positive aspect ("the treaties of the successor State begin automatically to apply in respect of the [ceded] territory as from the date of the succession") and a negative aspect ("the treaties of the predecessor State … cease automatically to apply in respect of the territory"); but in essence, the rule remains one of "a simple substitution of one treaty regime for concerned; with the result that, "with few exceptions, multilateral treaties which had applied to Hong Kong before handover continued to apply thereafter in all essential respects". 161 For bilateral treaties, the parties were also keen to preserve some autonomy for Macao and Hong Kong, but adopted a different approach: in the words of one commentator (speaking to the situation in Hong Kong), "none of the then existing bilateral treaties with third States would apply to the HKSAR after handover." 162 Rather, Hong Kong and Macao were entrusted directly to conclude bilateral agreements in their own right, which would then remain in force.
These considerations highlight the flexibility of the general framework, which does not preclude States from agreeing on special solutions for particular problems -and which in the case of Hong Kong and Macao, allowed the parties to implement the 'one country, two systems' approach that informed the eventual arrangements.
Looking at developments since 1978, perhaps it could be said that practice has not only been sparse, but also dominated by unusual cases; and that the arrangements on the basis of the considerations advanced above, 168 the better view would be to purposefully avoid the full integration of the ceded territory), the moving treaty frontiers rule needs to be qualified.
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Whatever position is taken on the geographical scope of Chinese BITs, it is worth noting that outside the particular arrangements obtaining in Macao and Hong Kong, cessions and incorporations raise few problems. The limited practice available so far in fact suggests that they are dealt with routinely, by a simple application of the moving frontiers rule. In line with that rule, German BITs concluded before unification were routinely applied to the GDR after 1990. 170 As for institutional arrangements, Germany's ICSID membership was automatically extended to cover the united Germany in its entirety. 171 As regards Walvis Bay, the available evidence is limited; however, it seems the one investment treaty concluded by South Africa prior to 1994 (a 1974 BIT with Portugal) did not apply to Walvis Bay after its return to Namibia. incorporation). 173 All this suggests that instances of cession and incorporation do not give rise to any conceptual problems.
Concluding Observations
The preceding sections have revisited some of the more relevant issues facing concluded by their predecessors raises structural questions of general relevance: this is a major area of uncertainty. As the above analysis demonstrates, investment tribunals have so far avoided a full engagement with the long-standing conceptual debate between 'strict continuity' and 'clean slate' approaches. To some extent, they could do so as (in line with general developments), State parties to investment treaties have frequently determined the fate of prior BITs through explicit agreements -which almost inevitably ensure continuity in investment treaty relations. Given the renewed popularity, in recent scholarship, of the long-standing conceptual debate, it is worth underlining that, where no explicit agreement has been reached, there is room to engage with arguments based on implied, or tacit, consent: such arguments no doubt need to be made carefully, but in principle are available. The key task throughout is to identify the intention of the (putative) parties to the treaty, which does not have to be expressed in a particular form. Only if neither explicit nor implied consent can be established does the question of automatic succession to BITs arise. As noted above, the argument in favour of automaticity is a difficult one, as bilateral treaties have traditionally been seen as mere inter-State exchanges of benefits. However, claims for automatic treaty continuity should not be dismissed out of hand. They can e.g. be supported by reference to the particular nature of BITs, which after all establish rights of thirdparty beneficiaries; these could be said to devolve with the territory.
Stepping back from the debates about particularities, it is interesting to note that so far, the application of State succession rules to investment treaties has so far rarely become a major issue (though cases such as Sanum and World Wide Minerals may signal a change). To the extent that it is settled, investment lawyers seem comfortable in applying the general regime of State succession: by and large, they accept the general rules and give effect to them within the field of investment law.
Where the general regime is uncertain (as it notably is with respect to new States This preference for stability in investment treaty relations is in line with general trends in recent succession practice -and yet, it deserves to be mentioned, as it stands in marked contrast to debates during decolonisation, when arrangements benefiting foreign investors (then typically contract-based) prompted major controversy. Seen in this light, the pragmatic handling of State succession issues may be taken to reflect a gradual acceptance of the investment protection regime over the past decades.
